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QUESTIONS UNANSWERED: THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT AND INNOCENT WITNESSES
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION

In Ohio v. Reiner,' the United States Supreme Court examined
whether a witness who denies all culpability in a child's death may
still exercise a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.2 The Supreme Court previously held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege protects only those witnesses who have "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."3 Reiner
extends the application of this standard, questioning whether a witness who claims innocence to a crime could nonetheless have "reasonable cause" to fear that her testimony would expose her to a
criminal charge.4 The validity of the Fifth Amendment privilege was
pertinent to the case, since the legitimacy of the prosecution's grant
of witness immunity depended on whether the witness had the right
to assert the privilege. 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the Supreme Court of Ohio, concluding that a witness who asserts innocence may not be deprived the privilege against selfincrimination.6 The Supreme Court based its holding, in part, on the
notion that "one of the Fifth
Amendment's 'basic functions ... is to
7
"
men.
innocent
protect
This Note first argues that the Supreme Court provided inadequate analysis in its conclusion that an innocent witness may validly
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On
the one hand, the Court expands the privilege, continuing the modem

532 U.S. 17 (2001).
2 Id.
3 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365
(1917).
4 532 U.S. at 17.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 20 (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391, 424 (1957)).
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trend in Fifth Amendment cases.8 On the other hand, the Court relies
principally on a policy rationale that the privilege against selfincrimination is to protect innocent men, a justification that scholars
now believe is tenuous at best. 9 Not only is the Supreme Court's
analysis ambiguous, the Court passed on the opportunity to address
the more significant issue: how to justify the grant of immunity to an
innocent witness) Ultimately, the Reiner court provided a weak decision that leaves questions unanswered regarding the complexities of
the Fifth Amendment in the context of innocent, non-defendant witnesses.
II. BACKGROUND - HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "no person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 1 The First Congress
proposed this language in the Bill of Rights to ensure that the new
federal government would not interfere with a privilege against selfincrimination. 2 The establishment of an American privilege against
self-incrimination, however, was the effect of an Anglo-American
legal tradition traced back to the thirteenth century. 3
The privilege first developed in English common law courts as a
response to the inquisitorial modes of procedure used by the ecclesiastical courts, the Court of High Commission, and the Star Chamber.' 4 These courts used the "oath ex officio" in prosecuting heretics
who failed to conform their beliefs to the Church of England." The
oath forced heretics to swear before God to truthfully answer all
8 See MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 88 (1980); see also LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE

FIFTH AMENDMENT? 236 (1959).
9 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 8, at 27-29;

MAYERS,

supra note 8, at 60-67; Henry J.

Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 27 U. CIN.

L. REV. 671, 684-87 (1968); Robert B. McKay, Seif-Incrimination and the New Privacy,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 206-08 (1967); C. Dickerman Williams, Problems of the Fifth
Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 26-30 (1955).
10The Court expressly stated that they did not "address the question whether immunity
from suit under § 2945.44 was appropriate." Reiner, 532 U.S. at 17.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12 BERGER, supra note 8,
at I.
13 Id.

14Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Cross-Exantination, 85 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1632 (1997).
15

Id.
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questions before they even knew the crime of which they were accused or the identity of the accusers.' 6 Since these non-conformists
were helpless in redefining the substantive law that classified their
activities as criminal, they looked to the common law courts for selfdefense. 7 Common law lawyers found the oath "repugnant to their
political values,"' 8 and sought to prohibit the use of the oath by relying on the Latin maxim nemo tenetur sepisum prodere ("no man is

bound to accuse himself'). 9
One of the most famous cases regarding the legality of the oath
occurred in England in 1637.2o John Lilburne was arrested for importing seditious books into England.2' Upon questioning by the
chief clerk to the attorney general about his knowledge of the seditious books, Lilburne ceased to cooperate.22 Two weeks later, Lilburne was brought before the Star Chamber office and refused to take
the oath ex officio.2 3 He was held in contempt of court and impris-

oned for two years.24 In 1640, however, Parliament reconvened and
Lilburne saw the opportunity to petition for his release. 5 Both
houses of Parliament found that the Star Chamber illegally sentenced
Lilburne.2 6 In addition, a 1641 statute abolished the Court of High
Commission and the Star Chamber altogether. 7 This statute finally
abolished the oath ex officio, and the "right against compulsory selfincrimination was established" in the ecclesiastical courts.2"
Lilburne was subsequently put on trial for treason, and again argued that there was no requirement that he answer questions about
himself.29 The court agreed, and as a result of this trial, "courts uniformly honored such refusals."3 Moreover, a 1662 statute provided
16Id.
'7

Id.

'8 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Article: An Alternative to the Constitutional
Privilege

Against Self-Incrimination, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 31, 36 (1982).

19Nesson & Leotta, supra note 14, at 1632-33.
supra note 8, at 14.
21 Id. at 15.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 17.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.at 18.
27 Id.
20 BERGER,

28 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

29 Bonventre, supra note 18, at 38.
30 Id.

282 (1968).
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that "no one shall administer to any person whatsoever the oath usually called ex-officio, or any other oath, whereby such persons may
be charged or compelled to confess any criminal matter."', Thus, the
prohibition of the oath ex officio finally extended to the courts of
law.32
It is unsurprising that English legal traditions were followed in
America, as British subjects primarily settled most of the colonies.33
Since the colonists felt they were subjected to British violations of
common law, they determined that written constitutions were neces34
sary to ensure their fundamental rights after the Revolutionary War.
Based on the resistance to the oath ex officio in England and the use
of inquisitorial procedures in America, the privilege against selfincrimination was one issue recognized in the new constitutions.35
The constitutional convention in 1787 did not establish a bill of
rights, and the convention adjourned prior to ratifying written protection for fundamental liberties. 6 Yet it became clear that a bill of
rights was necessary to alleviate suspicions about the newly formed
federal government.37 After Congress assembled in 1789, James
Madison took responsibility for such a document.38 His first proposal
regarding the right to silence "provided that no person 'shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."' 3 9 An amendment in the
House, however, limited the right to criminal matters and was then
left unchanged by the Senate.4" With relatively little debate, Congress included the self-incrimination privilege in the Bill of Rights. 4'
Almost twenty years later, Chief Justice Marshall wrote one of

31 Id.
32

Id.

33 BERGER,

supra note 8, at 20.
id. at 22.
35 The privilege against self-incrimination was included before 1789 in the constitutions
or bill of rights of the following seven states: Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Although New York, New Jersey,
Georgia and South Carolina did not enact a separate bill of rights, freedom from selfincrimination recognized by the English common law was kept in force. Furthermore, the
lack of a written constitution in Rhode Island and Connecticut did not necessarily imply that
these states accepted compulsory self-incrimination. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 23.
39 Id.
40 Id.
34

41 Id.
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the earliest interpretations of the Fifth Amendment during the trial of
Aaron Burr.4 2 In this case, Aaron Burr was tried for treason and a
misdemeanor in preparing for a military mission against Mexico, a
Spanish territory at peace with America.43 Before the grand jury,
Burr's secretary, Mr. Willie, was asked whether Aaron Burr instructed him to copy a certain paper." He refused to answer, fearing
his testimony would incriminate him.45 The Chief Justice stated that
if a direct answer may incriminate a witness, the witness must be the
sole judge of what his answer would be.46 He went on to find that the
court could not participate with him in the judgment, because the
court could not decide the effect of an answer without knowing what
it would be." This disclosure of the fact to the court would strip the
witness of the privilege that the law alows.48
This literal explanation of the Fifth Amendment was unsatisfactory to many of the states and the federal government.4 9 In the century after Burr's trial, many jurisdictions passed statutes providing
witnesses immunity from prosecution in exchange for compelled testimony." These statutes were based on the view that a witness could
not be incriminating himself if given immunity from prosecution in
connection to his testimony.5' The Court first considered the constitutionality of one of these statutes in 1892.52 In Counselman v.
Hitchcock, the Court struck down an immunity statute, since the statute did not prevent the use of the witness's testimony "to search out
other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property."53
Thus, the statute left the witness open to prosecution after answering
incriminating questions, and therefore did not "supply a complete
protection from all of the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard."5 4

42

U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38,40(1807).

43 Id.
44

Id.

45 Id.
46

Id.

4"7 Id.

48

Id.

49 RONALD
50

J. ALLEN

ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Id.

51 Id.

See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
id.at 564.
54 Id.at 585-86.
52

13

620 (2001).
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When the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue, however, a
sharply divided Court upheld a new statute compelling testimony in
exchange for an immunity grant. 5 Although the holding of Brown v.
Walker concerned the constitutionality of the immunity statute, the
Court stated in dicta that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination did not apply in certain classes of cases; therefore an
immunity grant was not always necessary to compel testimony.56 The
Court explained that "[w]hen examined, these cases will all be found
to be based upon the idea that, if the testimony sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against
the witness, the rule ceases to apply."57 The Court recognized that
the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment was confined to real
danger. 8 Since Brown, the Fifth Amendment privilege is generally
unavailable unless the witness's testimony could result in punishment.59
Two early twentieth-century United States Supreme Court decisions elaborate on this more restrictive view of the Fifth Amendment
privilege.6" In Heike v. United States,61 a witness claimed that his
grant of transactional immunity for prior testimony in an antitrust investigation of the sugar industry also covered allegations of revenue
offenses against him for fraudulently weighing sugar.62 The Court
found that providing information in the antitrust case did not sufficiently risk incrimination regarding the fraud prosecution in order to
be protected by the immunity grant. 63 Four years later, the Supreme
Court continued to find exception to the privilege in Mason v. United
States.64 The Court adopted the language from an 1861 English
case, 65 announcing that the privilege against self-incrimination was
confined to circumstances where the witness had "reasonable cause
to apprehend danger" from a direct answer in testifying. 66 Moreover,

55See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 49, at 622.
56 Brown, 161 U.S. at 597.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 599-600.
59 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 49, at 622.

60 BERGER, supra note 8, at 86.
61 227 U.S. 131 (1913).

62 Id. at 139-40.
63 Id. at 143-44.
64 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
65 Regina v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).

66 Mason, 244 U.S. at 365-66.
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the danger had to be "real and appreciable," rather than "a danger of
an imaginary and unsubstantial character . . . so improbable
that no
67

reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.,
Beginning in 1950, however, a series of cases construing the incrimination danger requirement resulted in a marked change from the
Supreme Court's earlier decisions.68 Indeed, in this period, the Court
"expanded the privilege beyond all previous precedent., 69 In Blau v.
United States,7 ° a witness refused to answer questions about the
Communist party. In finding a valid claim to the privilege, the Court
recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects responses which would
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed" to prosecute the witness." The next year in Hoffman v. United States,72 the Court again
upheld the assertion of the privilege by a witness called before a federal grand jury investigating frauds against the government, including
violations of customs, narcotics, and liquor laws. The questions
posed to Hoffman involved his relationship to another witness who
had failed to appear before the grand jury.73 Hoffman asserted his
privilege against self-incrimination. 74 In finding that Hoffman validly claimed the privilege, the Court concluded that Hoffman could
reasonably fear danger of prosecution of federal offenses.7" The facts
that Hoffman had a twenty-year police record, that he was publicly
declared an "underworld character and racketeer," and that the government had placed his name on a list of known gangsters were pertinent to the Court's decision.76 The Court stated that the lower courts
should have recognized that "the chief occupation of some persons
involves evasion of criminal laws," and that "one person with a police record summoned to testify before a grand jury investigating the
rackets might be hiding or helping to hide another person of questionable repute sought as a witness."7 7 Based on Hoffman's history

of crime and reputation, the Court found his responses could "forge

67

Id.
supra note 8, at 87.
supra note 8, at 236.
340 U.S. 159 (1950).
Id. at 161.
341 U.S. 479, 481,490 (1951).
Id.at 481.
Id.at 482.
Id.at 490.
Id.at 489.
Id.at 487-88.

68 BERGER,

69 MAYERS,
70

71

72
73
74

75
76

77
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links in a chain of facts" that could lead to conviction. 8
Shortly thereafter, a second witness was called before the same
grand jury, and claimed the Fifth Amendment in refusing to name the
business in which he used a certain telephone number or disclose his
acquaintance with individuals in the numbers racket.79 The only danger of self-incrimination the witness's attorney could suggest was
that his answers could lead to subsequent investigations that in turn
could reveal that he was a business owner who employed individuals
in the numbers business, and that he willfully failed to withhold part
of their wages for income and social security tax purposes, which
could lead to federal criminal prosecution. 8 The appellate court believed the relationship between the questions by the grand jury and
violations of income tax and security laws were too remote to find a
reasonable danger of conviction." The Supreme Court, nevertheless,
found that the witness correctly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, merely referring to its decision in Hoffman.8
The Supreme Court further extended the protections of the Fifth
Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan.83 In this case, police arrested
Malloy in the course of a gambling raid. 84 He pled guilty to "the
crime of pool selling," and was sentenced to a year in jail and fined
$500.85 Sixteen months later, Malloy was called to testify before the
Superior Court of Hartford County for his knowledge about gambling, activities of which he was already tried and could not risk further incrimination. 6 He asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege on
the grounds that his answers to questions would tend to incriminate
him.87 The Court cited the standard articulated in Hoffmann: "it need
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result."88 The Court held that Malloy
78

Id. at 488.

79

Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1951).

80

Id.

81

United States v. Greenberg, 187 F.2d 35, 40 (1951).
Greenberg, 343 U.S. at 918.

82

84

378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 3.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 12-13.
Id.at3.

83

87
88

Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
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properly invoked the privilege, and noted that the lower courts failed
to "take sufficient account of the setting in which the questions were
asked."89 The setting involved the county's search for the identity of
the person who ran the pool-selling operation for which Malloy was
arrested.9" Malloy's answers could not tend to incriminate him due to
the defense of double jeopardy.91 However, the Court found that if
the identity of the gambling operator was revealed, Malloy's answers
could connect Malloy to a "more recent crime for which he might
still be prosecuted."" The result was practically a reversal of the
stance taken in Mason and Heike.93
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 15, 1995, Matthew Reiner, the respondent, and his wife
Deborah became parents to healthy twin boys, Alex and Derek.94 After the birth of the twins, both parents took a leave of absence from
work to care for their children. 95 The couple then hired a twenty-four
year old nanny, Susan Batt, who began working under Deborah's
supervision while Batt became acclimated to the family. 96 Deborah
spent the majority of her time at home throughout the first week of
Batt's employment. 97 In the last two weeks, prior to going back to
work, however, Deborah left Batt alone with the twins. 9 By August
14, 1995, Batt became the exclusive childcare provider. 99
During the week of August 20th, Deborah took Alex to a doctor
for an illness."' He remained sick throughout the week. 0 ' When
Deborah returned home from work the following Monday, Batt re-

89
90
91
92

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.

93 BERGER,

supra note 8, at 88.

94 Ohio v. Reiner, No. L-97-1002, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6025, at
*1.
95 Id.
96

Id.

97 Id.
98

Id.

99 Id.

tooId.
101 Id.
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ported that Alex had eaten well and slept for two five-hour periods." 2
Batt then left the Reiner household." 3 Concerned that Alex had slept
so long, Deborah called a physician. 4 The physician directed her to
examine Alex and the examination revealed nothing unusual.'
The respondent came home that night after Batt had already left
the Reiner home.'0 6 Alex again vomited before the respondent put
both twins to bed. 7 According to the respondent, Alex was whimpering when the respondent was going to bed.'08 Volunteering to
comfort the child, the respondent took Alex to a downstairs room and
put Alex face down on his chest.0 9 About thirty minutes later, Alex's
breathing became strained and he became unresponsive." 0 The respondent then took the child upstairs, awakened his wife and called
911."'1
When the EMTs arrived at the Reiner home, they found Alex
without a pulse or respiration and with blue skin." 2 They took him to
a nearby hospital and placed him on a respirator.' Two days later,
Alex was declared brain dead and removed from life support." 4
An autopsy showed retinal hemorrhages in both eyes, extensive
sub-dural and sub-arachnoid bleeding, and massive brain swelling." 5
The coroner also discovered evidence of an earlier cerebral hemorrhage." 6 The doctor concluded that Alex suffered from "shaken baby
syndrome" - the result of child abuse." 7 He set the time of injury as
the evening of Monday, August 28, 1995."' He also estimated that
Alex was shaken within no more than three hours of his respiratory
arrest and, in all likelihood, within minutes of the onset of the arId.at *2.
Id.
104 Id. at *3.
'05 Id.
106 Ohio v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ohio, 2000).
107 Id.
108 Id.
'09 Id.
11 Id.
IIId.
112 Id.
102
103

113

Id.

114 Id.
115

Ohio v. Reiner, No. L-97-1002, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6025, at *5.

116

Id.
Id.

117

118 Id.
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rest. "9
On the coroner's testimony and the respondent's admission, the
respondent was alone with Alex during the critical time.12 ' A Lucas
County Grand Jury indicted the respondent on a single count of involuntary manslaughter. 12 ' The2 2 respondent pled not guilty and the
matter proceeded to a jury trial.'
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Trial

At trial, the defense theory was that Susan Batt, rather than the
respondent, was the culpable party. 3 The defense relied on medical
testimony contradicting the coroner's opinion concerning the timing
of the injury, indicating that the injury could have occurred while
Alex was in the care of Batt.'24 Furthermore, the defense presented
evidence that the Reiner children were all healthy from birth until
August 11, 1995, after Batt became their nanny.'25 X-rays taken on
August 29, 1995 indicated that Alex had a broken rib and a broken
leg. 126 X-rays of Derek showed that he suffered from three broken
ribs.' 27 In addition, Deborah Reiner testified that her other child- had
no medical problems from the time28 of Alex's death until the trial, after Batt left the Reiner household.

Batt's attorney told the court in advance of her testifying that she
intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and that she would refuse to answer questions. 29 She
had previously declined to testify at prior related juvenile hearings on
grounds that she might incriminate herself' 3 Batt's attorney explained that, although Batt was not the target of a criminal investigation, "she had been with the victim within the potential time frame of
"19 Id.
120

Jd.

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id

125

127

Ohio v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ohio, 2000).
Id.
[d.

128

Id.

129

Id.at 674.

126

130Id.
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the fatal trauma, she was the focus of the defense, and she did not
know the identity of defense witnesses who may be called to inculpate her."'' Batt
would only testify if granted "complete and abso32
lute immunity.',
The prosecution was initially confused as to why Batt refused to
testify.'33 Batt had explained to the Children's Services Board that
she had no involvement with the victim's injuries, and her counsel
did not indicate that her testimony would incriminate her.'3 4 The
prosecution notified the trial court that it had no intention of prosecuting Batt.13 They were not investigating her and there was insufficient evidence to present to the grand jury.'36 The prosecution informed the court, "I don't know how in the interest of justice I can
request immunity for this witness because it doesn't seem to me that
she in any way has anything to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
to protect herself, or I'm unaware of anything."' 37 When it became
clear that Batt would not testify, however, the prosecution agreed to
consider a request that the court grant Batt "transactional immunity,
rather than request that the 3court use its contempt powers to force a
reluctant witness to testify.'
After Batt invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial, the
prosecution requested that the court grant her transactional immunity
pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code 2945.44.13' The court subse131 Id.
132

Id.

133Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136

Id.

137Id.
138 Id. A trial court's authority to grant immunity in Ohio is "derived solely
from statute." State ex rel. Leis v. Outcalt, 438 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ohio, 1982).
139Section 2945.44 of the Ohio Revised Code provides, in pertinent part:

(A) If a witness refuses to answer or produce information on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, the court of common pleas of the county in which the proceeding is being
held, unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration of justice, shall compel the
witness to answer or produce the information, if both of the following apply:
(I) The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the proceedings are being held makes a written request to the court of common pleas to order the witness to answer or produce the information, notwithstanding his claim of privilege;
(2) The court of common pleas informs the witness that by answering, or producing the information he will receive immunity under division (B) of this section.
(B) If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold an answer or any
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quently conducted a hearing to determine whether the grant of immunity would "further the administration of justice."'4 ° The court failed
to address the prosecution's earlier remarks that Batt had no reason to
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, other than her fear of Mr.
Reiner's defense.14" ' The court nonetheless decided that it would be in
the "interests of justice" to compel Batt to testify, and it granted her
immunity. 142
Under such immunity, Batt denied any involvement with Alex
Reiner's death.'43 She also stated that she had initially refused to testify without immunity based on advice of counsel, even though she
Furthermore, she attested to the fact that she
did nothing wrong.'
had never shaken Alex or Derek, and more specifically, never shook
Alex on the day he suffered respiratory arrest.'45 She finally remarked that she was unaware of and had no involvement with the
other injuries to either child.'46
The jury found the respondent guilty as charged.' 47 The trial
court denied the defense's motion for judgment of acquittal or a new
trial.' 48 The court sentenced the respondent to incarceration of five to
twenty-five years.'49 However, the court suspended the sentence and
placed the respondent on five years probation.'
2. Ohio Court ofAppeals

The respondent appealed his conviction, setting forth nine as-

information given in any criminal proceeding, and he complies with an order under division (A)
of this section compelling him to give an answer or produce any information, he shall not be
prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty in the courts of this state for or on account of any
transaction or matter concerning which, in compliance with the order he gave an answer or produced any information.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44 (Anderson 2003).
140Reiner, 731 N.E.2d at 674.
141Id.

Id.
143Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).
144Id.
142

45 Id.
146 Id.

147 Ohio v. Reiner, No. L-97-1002, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6025, at *6.

Id.
149Id.
150Id.
148
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signments of error, including the fact that: "the trial court committed
prejudicial error by granting immunity to a witness who had no claim
of Fifth Amendment privilege because her self-exonerating testimony would not tend to incriminate her."' 52
The court of appeals initially agreed with the respondent that under section 2945.44 of the Ohio Revised Code, a grant of immunity
first demands a threshold determination as to whether the claim of a
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is valid.15 The
court also agreed that a trial court must make some determination of
the validity of the privilege, since the witness's claim alone is not
adequate.' 54 However, the defense argued that no valid privilege existed at all for Batt because a privilege was only available if the "witness ha[d] a real and appreciable fear of incrimination and prosecution.""' The court disagreed that the determination of the validity of
the privilege had to result from a formal procedure.'
The court relied on Hoffman, which held that it is "sufficient if
the record contains information by which the trial court could conclude that it did not clearly appear that the witness was mistaken in
claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege."' 57 Under this test, the trial
court determined that the following facts were relevant in the analy152 Id. The respondent's other assignments of error included the
following:
1)The verdict is contrary to the evidence's manifest weight ...3) The trial court committed
prejudicial error by not granting defendant's motion for new trial on the ground of prosecutorial
misconduct involving the State's improper request for immunity for Susan Batt to procure her
testimony, despite the prosecutor's knowledge that Batt was not entitled to such immunity, 4)

The trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to strike the opinions about axonal shearing being the mechanism that caused the respiratory arrest and eventual death of Alex Reiner, 5)
The trial court committed prejudicial [sic] failing to permit the defendant to prove the fact and
content of the prior inconsistent statement of the Lucas County Coroner during his grand jury
testimony, 6) The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to strike the opinion of the
State's expert witness Dr. Elizabeth K. Balraj M.D. whose opinion regarding a causative event
was expressed in terms of mere possibility, no probability, 7) The court committed reversible error in refusing to give the instruction proposed by the defense on the permissible inference to be
drawn from Susan Batt's silence in the face of an accusation of guilt, 8) The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to grant defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close
of the State's case-in-chief, and 9) The trial court committed prejudicial error by not granting
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground ofjuror misconduct.
Id. at
*6-8.
153 Id. at *10-11 .
'54

Id.

'55 Id.at

*10.
156Id.at *11.
7 Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 490 (1951)).
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sis: the defense theory blamed Batt for Alex's death, the court had no
knowledge of what evidence the defense would present implicating
Batt, and it was uncertain what inculpatory statements Batt would
make under cross-examination.' Based on these circumstances, the
court of appeals concluded that at the time of the trial court's decision, it did not clearly appear that Batt's assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination was mistaken."59 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with respect to this issue. 6
However, the appellate court ultimately reversed the district court
based on a matter involving allegations of juror misconduct.' 6 '
3. Supreme Court of Ohio

The State of Ohio appealed the decision of the court of appeals
to reverse the trial court on the juror misconduct issue.'62 The respondent cross-appealed to, among other things, challenge the validity of the transactional immunity granted to Batt.'63
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court decision
to grant Batt transactional immunity. 164 The court asserted that a
grant of immunity is not necessary when a witness disclaims all culpability. 165 It further stated that "in situations where an admission of
guilt by one person would completely exonerate any possible guilt of
another person, as is the case here, a grant of immunity is unnecessary and improper.' 66 The court reasoned that granting immunity in
such a situation may allow the guilty party to go free, which would
not "further the administration of justice."167

The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the trial judge improperly
granted immunity.'68 Since the prosecution admitted that it had no
intention of prosecuting Batt, the court then believed that the trial
judge had a duty to inquire into Batt's assertion of the privilege and

Id. at *12.
159Id.
160 Id.
158

161 Id. at *34.

162 Ohio v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662, 670 (Ohio, 2000).
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whether her testimony would be self-incriminating.169 Instead, the
court concluded that the trial judge relied only on Batt's claim of
privilege and disregarded the questions and concerns voiced by the
prosecution. 70
In its analysis, the Ohio Supreme Court first agreed with the respondent that prior to a grant of immunity to a witness, it is implicit
that the person validly asserted the privilege against selfincrimination. 7 ' The court dismissed the appellate court's focus on
circumstances that would lead the trial court to believe that Batt was
not clearly mistaken in asserting her Fifth Amendment right.1 2 The
court stated that again, these were merely Batt's assertions.'73 The
court pointed out that the court of appeals failed to consider the
prosecutors' statements or the fact that Batt denied any involvement
in Alex's
injuries when questioned by the Children's Services
74
Board. 1
The Supreme Court of Ohio's second point was that a "wrongful75
grant of immunity resulted in serious prejudice to the defendant.'
Since the defense theory was that Batt caused Alex's death, the grant
of immunity in effect told the jury that Batt was not responsible for
Alex's injuries.' 76 The court concluded that the jury should have
heard and evaluated all the evidence to determine
whether someone
77
other than the respondent caused Alex's death.1
The court next dismissed the State's argument that a defendant
lacks standing to challenge a grant of immunity since this assumed
that the immunity met the statutory threshold of a valid Fifth
Amendment privilege.7 7 Finally, the court rejected the State's argument that the respondent did not preserve any error for appeal because of a failure to object to the grant of immunity.'79 The defense
adequately objected at the trial court's hearing on whether the grant

"' Id.at 675.
170 Id.
171Id.
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of immunity would "further the administration of justice."1' 80
Justice Cook dissented in the majority's reversal of the grant of
immunity to Batt. 8 ' He first argued that the majority applied an inapposite test for reasonable cause when it decided that Batt's testimony "did not incriminate her because she had denied any involvement in the abuse."' 8 2 He also cited Hoffman, stating that the
privilege also extends to answers that furnished a "link in the chain of
'
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant."183
He also disagreed
with the majority's argument regarding prejudice to Mr. Reiner because a trial court's decision to grant or deny immunity is reviewable
only for an abuse of discretion. 84
The United States Supreme Court then granted the State of
Ohio's petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of reversal by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 85
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINION

In a per curiam decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding that a witness who denies all culpability does not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 86 The Court first recalled the facts and
procedural history of the case.'87 It then reiterated the Supreme Court
of Ohio's reasoning in its decision, noting that the Supreme Court of
Ohio recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies where a
witness's answer "could reasonably 'furnish a link in the chain of
evidence' against him." '88 The Court further acknowledged that
precedent requires the trial court to determine whether a witness may
validly assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and to order
the witness to answer questions if the witness is misguided regarding
the danger of incrimination.'89 The Court next recalled that the Supreme Court of Ohio faulted the trial judge for his failure to question

ISOId.at 675-76.
181 Id. at 679 (Cook, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Cook, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Cook, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 680 (Cook, J., dissenting).
185 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).
186 Id. at 18.
187 Id. at 18-20.
188 Id. at 19 (quoting Ohio v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662, 673 (Ohio,
2000)).
189
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sufficiently Batt's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 9 ' The
Court noted the facts the Supreme Court of Ohio relied upon, including the prosecutor's statement that Batt's testimony would not incriminate her, and Batt's denial of any role in Alex's abuse when
questioned by the Children's Services.' 9 ' Finally, the Court restated
the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding, that Batt's "testimony did not
incriminate her, because she denied any involvement in the abuse.
Thus she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege."' 92
Before rejecting the Supreme Court of Ohio's conclusion, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of its jurisdiction
over the case.'93 Based on prior Supreme Court precedent, the Court
has "jurisdiction over a state-court judgment that rests, as a threshold
matter, on a determination of federal law."' 94
The Court next analyzed the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.'95 It agreed with the Supreme Court of Ohio that
the privilege extends not only "to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would

furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant."' 96 The Court also acknowledged that in past cases it had held
that the privilege extends only to witnesses who have "reasonable
cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."' 97 It further
pointed out that the inquiry is for the court since the witness's assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination.' 98 Citing
Mason, the Court stated that a danger of "imaginary and unsubstantial character" will not suffice. 99
However, the Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of Ohio's
holding because the Court had never held that the privilege was unavailable to those who claim innocence.0 0 The Court cited Grunewald v. United States,"' where it emphasized that one of the Fifth
190Id.
191
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192
193
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Amendment's "basic functions is to protect innocent men who otherwise might be ensnared in ambiguous consequences. 2 0 2 The Court
felt that the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision conflicted with Hoffman and Grunewald.2 °3 It looked to several facts to conclude that
Batt had "reasonable cause" to apprehend danger from her answers if
questioned at Reiner's trial.20 4 It listed the facts that Batt spent extended periods of time alone with Alex, she was with Alex within the
potential time frame of the trauma, and the defense's theory that Batt
was responsible, as evidence of Batt's reasonable fear that answers to
questions might tend to incriminate her.2°5
Finally, the Court noted that it did not address whether the immunity from suit under section 2945.44 of the Ohio Revised Code
was appropriate.0 6 Since the Supreme Court of Ohio erroneously
held that Batt's assertion of innocence deprived her of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the peition for writ
of certiorari was granted, the Supreme Court of Ohio's judgment was
reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.20 7
V. ANALYSIS

In Reiner, the United States Supreme Court provided inadequate
analysis in determining that a witness who disclaims all liability for a
child's death may still validly assert her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Although the Court's holding follows
case precedent, continuing the ongoing expansion of the privilege,2 8
the Court's principal argument is based on a policy rationale that the
privilege against self-incrimination is to protect innocent men, a justification that scholars now believe is tenuous at best.20 9 Not only
does the Court provide ambiguous analysis, it failed to even address
the more significant issue: how to justify the grant of immunity to an
innocent, non-defendant witness. Thus, the Reiner Court provided a
weak decision that leaves questions unanswered regarding the complexities of the Fifth Amendment in the context of innocent witnesses.
202 Reiner, 532 U.S. at 21 (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S.
at 421).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 21-22.
206

Id. at 22.

207 Id.
208

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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text.
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A. MODERN TREND

This section demonstrates that the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Ohio v. Reiner follows prior decisions, continuing the expansion in
claims of incrimination. 1 ° In Hoffman, the Supreme Court noted that
the privilege against self-incrimination not only applies to witness's
responses to questions that would in themselves sustain a conviction,
but also applies to answers which would "furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute" the witness. 1 The Court qualified
the privilege, however, in stating that the "protection must be confined to instances where the witness ha[d] reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."2" 2 In Hoffman, the Court concluded that based on the witness's history of crime and his reputation
as a gangster, he could reasonably fear that his responses to questions
would forge links in a chain of facts which could lead to his conviction."1 Similarly, the Court in Greenberg held that the witness validly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege." 4 In that case, the
Court reasoned that the witness could reasonably apprehend danger
from answering questions regarding the numbers racket, since these
answers could connect him with a failure to withhold his employees'
wages for income and social security tax purposes. 5 Finally, in
Malloy v. Hogan, a witness was called to testify regarding gambling
activities, for which he was already tried and faced no further prosecution.2" 6 The Court upheld the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege, however, by taking into account "the setting in which the questions were asked."2 7 Since the man in charge of the gambling
operation was still at large, the witness's answers could connect him
to a more recent crime for which he could still be prosecuted.2 8
Consistent with these cases, the Supreme Court held in Reiner
that Ms. Batt properly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege.219
Even though Ms. Batt did not have a history or reputation of child
supra note 8, at 88; see MAYERS, supra note 8, at 236.
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951) (citing Blau v. United States,

210 BERGER,
211

340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950)).
212 Id. (citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365
(1917)).
213 Id.at 489-90.
214 Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1951)
215 Id.
216 378 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1964).
217 Id.at 13.
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219 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).
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abuse, her answers could provide a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute her for the child's death. 22' Following Hoffman,
she consequently had reasonable cause to apprehend danger of conviction. After the Hoffman and Greenberg cases, a federal appellate
court interpreted the circumstances under which the Supreme Court
would find a "link in the chain" of evidence:
It is enough (1) that the trial court be shown by argument how conceivably a prosecutor, building on the seemingly harmless answer, might proceed step by step to link
the witness with some crime ... and (2) that this suggested course and scheme of
linkage not seem incredible in the circumstances of the particular case. It is in this latter connection, the credibility of the suggested connecting chain ... may be significant. Finally, in determining whether the witness really apprehends danger in answering a question, the judge cannot permit himself to be skeptical; rather must he be
may be
acutely aware that in the deviousness of crime and its detection incrimination
22 1
approached and achieved by obscure and unlikely lines of inquiry.

It would seem then, that any plausible connection to a crime
would suffice for a finding of reasonable fear of prosecution. 22 As
long as the suggested chain of events was credible, such as the connection between the numbers racket and violations of the tax and social security laws, a witness may avoid answering questions by invoking the Fifth Amendment.223 In the same vein, the court in Reiner
noted that Ms. Batt was alone with Alex for lengthy periods of time
and that she was with Alex within the possible timeframe of the
trauma. 24 Regardless of Ms. Batt's claim of innocence, these facts
seemed to sufficiently link Ms. Batt to the child's death for the Court.
Moreover, her ties to the crime were more directly connected than the
ones demonstrated in Greenberg, where the Court still upheld the
witness's Fifth Amendment privilege. 225 Finally, the conclusion in
Reiner is consistent with the Malloy decision. In Malloy, the Court
looked to the setting in which the questions were asked in deternining that an injurious disclosure could result.226 Similarly, the Court

220

Id.

221 United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (1952).
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See Wollam v. United States, 244 F.2d 212 (1957) (stating that disclosure of address

could lead to incrimination); United States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d 921 (1956) (finding a connection between payments in an extortion charge and failure to report payments to the Internal Revenue Service).
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224 Reiner, 532 U.S. at 17.
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addressed the setting that Ms. Batt faced. 27 Since the defense's theory was that Ms. Batt was responsible for Alex's death and his twin
brother's other injuries, it was evident that answers to questions in
this setting might be dangerous. 28 Based on Ms. Batt's reasonable
cause to fear prosecution by answering, the Court found that she validly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 Thus, in line
with case precedent, the Court extended the Fifth Amendment privilege to an innocent witness.
The significant distinction between the prior cases and Reiner,
however, is that the witnesses in the prior cases were guilty of crimes.
In contrast, Ms. Batt in the Reiner case maintained innocence
throughout the entire judicial process.23 ° The Court disposes of this
distinction by relying on the policy that "one of the Fifth Amendment's basic functions is to protect innocent men. ' This rationale,
nevertheless, has been criticized by scholars and was expressly disclaimed by the Supreme Court itself. 32 The Court fails to address
this point, and perhaps more importantly, fails to consider how to rationalize the grant of immunity to an innocent witness. We turn to a
discussion of the policy justifications for the Fifth Amendment in the
next section.
B. AN INVALID POLICY JUSTIFICATION

The Supreme Court's principal argument for upholding Ms.
Batt's privilege against self-incrimination in Reiner is based on a
policy that scholars argue is improper. 33 There is no consensus
regarding the policy of the privilege, in part because it serves many
purposes in different settings.234 Nevertheless, the Court recognized
in the past that one of the goals of the Fifth Amendment privilege is
the protection of innocent individuals from unjust prosecution.23 In
adhering to this view in Reiner, the Court only cited cases that refer
to former Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold's book23 6 as support for this
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
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position. 237 This section will first address the hypothetical posed by
Griswold and the context in which he developed this rationale. It will
then examine the arguments why this policy justification has since
been "criticized by commentators" and "qualified by Dean Griswold
'
himself."238
1. Dean Griswold's Hypothetical

In 1955, Dean Griswold published a speech he delivered to the
Massachusetts Bar Association on February 5, 1954.239 He effectively argued that a witness may criminally damage himself when
forced to answer questions, even though he may not have committed
a criminal offense.24 ° His argument was aimed at House UnAmerican Activities Committee's effort to identify communist associations. 4 ' Even though the purpose was to gather information to aid
in enacting legislation, the effect of the investigations was to humiliate and isolate those with communist ties.242 Americans were not as
concerned with whether these investigations were unnecessarily abusive as they were with the number of witnesses who claimed innocence yet invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 243 A question arose as to what people feared if they
were innocent. 44
Dean Griswold touched upon this question in his speech of
1954.245 He clearly stated his position that "another purpose of the
Fifth Amendment is to protect the innocent.2 146 He posed the following hypothetical: A college professor does not find what he's looking
for in the established political parties so he enters the Communist
party. 2' He later drifts away from the group during the time of the
237

Reiner, 531 U.S. at 19 (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421

(1957); Slochowerv. Board of Higher Ed. Of City of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956)).
238 BERGER, supra note 8, at 27.
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Korean invasion, but never formally resigns.248 A Congressional
Committee then summons him for questioning, and asks whether he
was ever a Communist.249 Although he honestly believes he is innocent of any crime, he is under substantial risk of guilt under the Smith
Act of 1940.250 Since past affiliation with the Communist party could
be a "link in a chain of proof of a criminal charge," he decides to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, yet he is not guilty of any crime.
251

The courts embraced Griswold's hypothetical and claim that the
Fifth Amendment was to "protect the innocent." In Grunewald v.
United States, the court referred directly to Griswold's speech stating
that "recent re-examination of the history and meaning of the Fifth
Amendment has emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of
the privilege is to protect innocent men."25 Similarly, the Court in
Slochower cites Griswold for the proposition that the "privilege
serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by
ambiguous circumstances. 253
2. The Critics
The view that the purpose of the privilege against selfincrimination is to protect the innocent has been criticized for several
reasons. 254
First, several scholars have objected to the
"protecting the innocent" justification because the highly factual hypothetical posed by Dean Griswold does not necessarily mean that a
purpose of the privilege is protection of the innocent.255 Rather than
addressing Fifth Amendment goals, the argument could be duplicat25 6
ing the First Amendment's role of safeguarding freedom of belief.
The context of government invasion into an individual's beliefs
posed in Griswold's hypothetical may only create an illusion that the

141 Id. at 12-13.
249

250

Id. at 15.
Id. The Smith Act of 1940 banned advocacy for the violent overthrow of the gov-

ernment. Although communist membership per se was not enough to support a conviction,
membership in addition to other evidence would suffice. BERGER, supra note 8, at 28. See
also Griswold, supra note 236, at 15-16.
251 GRISWOLD, supra note 236, at 15.
252 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
253 Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. Of City ofN.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).
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privilege is protecting innocence. 57 Judge Henry Friendly agreed
with this position in stating that "however appropriate [Dean Griswold's] comments were in the context in which they were written,
courageously supporting use of the privilege to defeat outrageous inquiries into beliefs and associations, they do no help in the decision
258
of concrete cases arising in the enforcement of the criminal law.
Most importantly, Dean Griswold himself has acknowledged how the
events of the time impacted his analysis, revealing that "those were
somewhat parlous times, and the speeches were made under some
emotional pressure." '59 Furthermore, Griswold retracted the original
statements from his 1954 speech, explaining the following:
Others have said, and I think they are right, that the privilege protects the guilty more
often that it does the innocent .... It is enough to say that the privilege is available to
protect those who are guilty only of heretical or unpopular beliefs. The privilege is
fully justified and is of first importance if it serves to protect dissent and opposition to
the government, and all matters of thought and freedom and opinion which, as history
shows are central to the preservation of political and intellectual and religious liberty.2A

Protection of freedom of thought and association is already addressed under the First Amendment.26' Perhaps the First Amendment
should be applied to Dean Griswold's innocent witness so that "Fifth
Amendment doctrine
is not distorted by being tied to an objective it
26 2
cannot fulfill.
A second criticism to the notion that the Fifth Amendment's
purpose is to protect the innocent is the practical application of the
concept. Scholars question whether protection of the innocent is actually achieved as a consequence of the Fifth Amendment. 2" Lewis
Mayers acknowledged that several courts and commentators have asserted protection of the innocent.264 He argues, however, that there
has been lacking "any convincing demonstration of this proposition. '265 Judge Friendly concurred that no proof of protection of the
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innocent has been offered.26 6 He further stated that "on balance the
privilege so much more often shelters the guilty and even harms the
innocent that ...its occasional effect in protection of the innocent
would be an altogether insufficient reason." '67 Dean Griswold himself
has agreed that protection of the innocent as a Fifth Amendment purpose is not justified from a practical perspective.268 He stated "it was
a mistake, I now think, to undertake to defend the privilege on the
ground that it is basically designed to protect those innocent of crime,
'
Thus, a deficiency of actual cases
at least in any numerical sense."269
to support the 'protection of the innocent' rationale leaves its validity
in question. It is difficult to justify a broad rule based on so narrow
an impact.270
A third criticism expressed by C. Dickerman Williams is that the
notion of protecting the innocent from the English case Regina v.
Boyes"' is applied with a "reverse twist" by U.S. courts. 2 72 In Boyes,
a witness was called to testify in a case involving bribery in an election to the House of Commons.2 73 The Queen granted the witness a
pardon, and under English law, he was required to accept it.274 He asserted the privilege of self-incrimination based on the fact that, even
with his pardon, he could be left open to impeachment by the House
of Commons.275 The court rejected the claim of privilege, finding
that there was no reasonable ground for the witness to apprehend
danger.2 76 Although he could be subject to impeachment, the court
stated "no one seriously supposes that the witness runs the slightest
risk of an impeachment by the House of Commons. No instance of
occurred, or, so far as we are aware,
such a proceeding ...has2 7ever
7
has ever been thought of.
Since Boyes, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied upon the 'rea-
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sonable danger' rule and has quoted the opinion at length. 27 In Mason, the Court definitively adopted it.279 Williams argued, however,
that the Court has misapplied the Boyes decision.8 In Boyes, even
though the witness's testimony revealed a crime, the witness was unable to claim the privilege since there was not reason to anticipate
that he would be prosecuted on the basis of that testimony. 28 ' In other
words, even though the witness could have been prosecuted for a
crime, he could not say that he had reasonable cause to apprehend
danger of conviction since it was unlikely that the House of Commons would pursue prosecution. 2 The U.S. courts now apply that
reasoning to "justify the refusal to give testimony that will not reveal
a crime [since the witness is innocent] ... because of the witness's

alleged anticipation of prosecution for a crime of which he is innoincent."2" 3 Thus, Williams points out that circumstances in Boyes 284
criminal.
a
against
proceed
to
prosecutors
by
volved unwillingness
In contrast, the circumstances in present cases involve the witness's
assumption of the willingness by prosecutors to proceed against an
innocent man. 285 Thus, the validity of the application of Boyes to present cases seems doubtful.28 6
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court itself
has disclaimed reliance on the idea that a purpose of the Fifth
Amendment is to protect the innocent. 7 In Tehan v. United States ex
rel. Schott,2ss the Court considered whether the no comment rule under Griffin v. California219 should be applied retroactively. In Griffin,
the prosecutor's closing argument included disparaging remarks to
the jury regarding the defendant's failure to take the stand to explain
why he was in an alley where a murder victim's body was found.29 °
In addition, the trial judge's instructions stated that "if [the defen-

Williams, supra note 9, at 28.
Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
280 Williams, supra note 9, at 26.
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dant] does not testify... the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate ... that among the inferences that may be

reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable." '91 The Supreme Court concluded that any comment about the defendant's silence violated the Fifth Amendment because it "is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitu'
tional privilege."292
In Tehan, the no-comment rule would have been
applied retroactively if the purpose of the privilege was a concern
over the conviction of an innocent defendant.293 This was not the
concern of the Court, however, in holding that the no-comment rule
only applied prospectively.294 Justice Stewart stated "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not
relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are
not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shoulder the load . . .,"9"

Thus, the Court at last rejected the proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege is largely concerned with protecting the innocent.296 It
follows that the Supreme Court mistakenly relied on this policy justification for the Fifth Amendment in its conclusion in Reiner. Ultimately, prior Fifth Amendment cases and the Court's express repudiation of the policy rationale upon which it relied are in tension,
leaving a muddled and unclear analysis by the Court.
C. AN INNOCENT PERSON DOES NOT NEED IMMUNITY

Not only did the Supreme Court provide ambiguous analysis in
its opinion, but the Court failed to even address the more significant
issue: how to justify the grant of immunity to an innocent nondefendant witness. 97 Extending the Fifth Amendment to innocent
witnesses is pertinent to cases where state immunity statutes include a
threshold requirement of a valid privilege of self-incrimination.29 In
state statutes similar to Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.44, once the
court finds that a witness has properly invoked the privilege, it must
then determine whether granting immunity to a witness "furthers the
291

292
293
294
295
296
297
298

Id. at 610.
Id. at 614.
McKay, supra note 9,at207.
Id.
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Schott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966).
McKay, supra note 9, at 208.
See supra note 10.
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).

OHIO v. REINER

20021

administration of justice."299 The question the Reiner court neglected
to answer is why does an innocent person need immunity from prosecution in the first place?
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio's majority opinion addressed the issue of innocent witnesses and transactional immunity,
its analysis did not reach the question either.3"' The court first
pointed out that "there is no need for a grant of immunity where the
witness denies all culpability."'30 ' The court focused, however, on the
fact that Reiner's defense was Ms. Batt caused Alex's death. The
court stated the following:
In situations where an admission of guilt by one person would completely exonerate
any possible guilt of another person, as is the case here, a grant of immunity is unnecessary and improper ....Had Susan Batt been granted immunity and testified that
she had shaken Alex and caused his death, the prosecution would have no further
grounds to prosecute Matthew Reiner. To grant immunity in such a situation may
the guilty party to go free and would not 'further the administration of
have allowed
3 02
justice.'

The court went on to conclude that serious prejudice resulted
from the grant of immunity to Ms. Batt. °3 Since Reiner's defense
was that Ms. Batt caused Alex's death, the court's grant of immunity
to her was in effect telling the jury that Batt was not responsible for
Alex's death.30 4 In order to "further the administration of justice," the
jury should have heard all the evidence to determine whether someone other than Reiner caused Alex's death.30 5 Thus, the court focused
on the limited situation where a defendant's only defense involved a
witness who was granted immunity. So the Ohio Supreme Court also
failed to reach the question of why an innocent witness needs a grant
of immunity.
Some may question why this inquiry is even significant. They
may argue that the outcome of granting immunity to an innocent witness is the same: the witness will not be prosecuted. However, the
grant of witness immunity is an exchange of useful testimony that
may assist in the conviction of a defendant for the avoidance of
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prosecution." 6 If the prosecution is already entitled to that useful testimony, why should the court grant the witness immunity? Even
though the emphasis in our time is usually on the right of an individual to remain silent, this right is limited and exceptional." 7 In fact,
the general rule is that an individual has a duty to testify before grand
juries, courts, or investigating committees that have legitimate interests.3 8 As Chief Justice Hughes noted, "[I]t is . . . beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government
is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and
giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned."30 9 Thus, it
is worth considering whether or not immunity should apply to innocent witnesses. The Supreme Court passed on this opportunity and
provided no guidance in this context of the Fifth Amendment and
witness immunity.
V1. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court provided a deficient analysis in Reiner. The
Court first unconvincingly determined that an innocent witness may
assert a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the extension of the privilege is in line with prior precedent,
the policy rationale relied upon is criticized by both scholars and the
Court itself The Court then failed to address the issue of whether the
prosecution should grant immunity to an innocent witness. In the
end, the weak decision in Reiner leaves questions unanswered with
respect to the complexities of the Fifth Amendment in the context of
innocent witnesses.
Angela Roxas
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